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The business models of major Web search engines depend on online advertising, primarily in the form of keyword 
advertising. In recent years, a controversy has gained notoriety worldwide, in both the international court systems 
and the media. It concerns a form of potential ―bait and switch‖ advertising where a consumer, searching using the 
brand name of one company, is presented with an advertisement by a competitor of the searched-for brand. We 
refer to this practice as ―piggybacking.‖ In the U.S. in particular, the legality of this practice, and the potential liability 
of the search engines for contributing to trademark infringement, is unclear. However, the eventual resolutions of the 
issue could significantly and negatively impact the business model of Internet search engines. In this paper, we 
investigate the actual prevalence of piggybacking of major brands in U.S. search engines. We submitted 100 search 
queries consisting of top global brand names to three major search engines. Analysis of 2,350 advertisements from 
search engine results pages showed that just 4 percent were triggered by competitors‘ trademarked terms. There 
was even lower use of those trademark terms in the ad text. Thus, overall competitive piggybacking does not appear 
to be a deceptive or widespread phenomenon. Implications for this are discussed, and suggestions for future 
research are presented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of keyword advertising has had a tremendous effect on online advertising, Internet marketing, search 
engines, and websites that earn advertising revenue. Current projections predict that Internet advertising will 
continue to grow and that keyword advertising, also known as sponsored search, contextual advertising, or pay-per-
click (PPC) advertising, will be the dominant form [IDG, 2008]. Internet advertising provides the revenue base for 
major search engines, such as Google and Yahoo!, as well as many content-based websites. In 2009, Google 
earned $23.7 billion, and 97 percent of this revenue came from keyword advertising [Google, 2009]. Keyword 
advertising is critical as a revenue stream for the major search engines and appears to be their major business 
model for the foreseeable future. 
 
Keyword advertising works as follows. When a searcher enters a query into a search engine, all or part of the query 
may trigger the display of one or more ads on the search engine results page (SERP). If the searcher clicks on an 
ad, a page from the advertiser‘s website (known as the landing page) is displayed. The advertiser is then charged by 
the search engine (i.e., pay per click). 
 
As Google and other search engine companies push to sell ads crucial to their revenue growth, some advertisers 
are growing angry with the way the search engines oversee their keyword advertising [cf., Steel, 2008]. The problem 
is a tactic that has been labeled, piggybacking, which we define in the context of search engine keyword advertising, 
as advertisers selecting other companies‘ brand names, slogans, or other trademarked terms or phrases, as 
keywords to trigger the display of their ads. We believe the term to be apropos, as this usage is consistent with the 
dictionary definition, ―piggyback: to set up or cause to function in conjunction with something larger, more important, 
or already in existence or operation‖ [Merriam-Webster, 2010]. In this sense, the advertiser‘s ad display is 
piggybacking on the positive attributes of another organization‘s trademark. 
 
One example is a television campaign by automaker Pontiac urging viewers to ―Google Pontiac‖ [Carty, 2006]. 
During the campaign, some consumers who searched using the term Pontiac were greeted by comparison ads 
sponsored by competing automaker Mazda, which had bid on Pontiac‘s trademark. A few advertisers and others 
have formed an organization, the Alliance Against Bait & Click, in order to ―make deceptive search ads a thing of the 
past‖ [AABC, 2008]. There have been numerous U.S. court cases concerning the practice [cf., Ascentive, 2009; 
Rescuecom, 2009]. However, the issue remains unresolved. 
 
Google‘s policies have allowed piggybacking in the U.S., Canada, Ireland, and the U.K., and as of June 4, 2009, 
Google expanded this practice virtually worldwide [Orey, 2009], with the notable exception of most countries in the 
European Union [Naffziger, 2009b]. If piggybacking becomes more widespread, the results could significantly impact 
advertisers, search engines, and customers. For example, if piggybacking causes consumer confusion, as some 
advertisers claim [Sullivan, 2007], customers could become frustrated with sponsored search, leading to a drop in 
the number of clicks on ads. Lower click through rates would decrease the revenue of the major search engine 
companies, whose major income stream is keyword advertisements, as well as decrease the sales of current online 
advertisers. Regardless of consumer reaction, widespread piggybacking will certainly increase the bidding, and thus 
the cost of trademarked keywords, as well as encourage more large advertisers to bid on their own, now more 
expensive, trademarks, thus increasing advertiser expenses. In addition, should the courts determine that 
piggybacking can constitute trademark infringement and that search engines are at least partially liable for that 
infringement, then search engines may face the expensive burden of monitoring each and every query for trademark 
infringement: 
We [Google] are currently defending this policy in trademark infringement lawsuits in the United States …. 
Adverse results in these lawsuits may result in, or even compel, a change in this practice which could result 
in a loss of revenue for us, which could harm our business. 
Google, 2005, p. 27. 
Given the multiple potential threats to the Internet search engine business model by the practice of piggybacking, it 
seems important to understand the nature and prevalence of the piggybacking phenomenon. How widespread and 
deceptive is piggybacking? Is it truly a potential major threat that begs for comprehensive user impact studies? Or is 
the piggybacking controversy simply a play by larger advertisers to stifle competition for customers, as well as 
minimize advertising costs? There is little research, and no comprehensive survey, of piggybacking in this area to 
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date. The major contribution of our research is to examine the prevalence and potential deceptiveness of a practice 
that may have wide-ranging negative consequences for the entire global search engine industry. 
 
This research analyzes the search results of three major U.S. search engines after the 100 top global brand 
trademarks were submitted to each of them as 100 individual search queries. A classification of piggybacking ads 
was developed, with an analysis of their prevalence overall, as well as by market sector. The implications of these 
results for the future of keyword advertising are discussed, with suggestions for future research. First, we present 
the conceptual background of the intertwining issues and stakeholders which come into play in this phenomenon of 
piggybacking. 
II. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Overviews and histories of keyword advertising are available [Fain and Pedersen, 2006; Jansen and Mullen, 2008], 
including an analysis of search engine marketing strategy [Sen, 2005]. The terminology surrounding the practice of 
piggybacking is varied and inconsistent. O‘Connor [2007], the only academic researcher to our knowledge who has 
currently published in this area, simply refers to it as trademark abuse, a category which could presumably include 
more than what is defined here as piggybacking. Steel [2008] defines piggybacking to include the unapproved use of 
the trademark in the actual text of the ad. Without the trademark in the ad text, the unapproved use of a trademark to 
trigger the ad is termed a conquest buy. When the 2008 campaign of U.S. presidential candidate John McCain 
bought Joe Biden as a political advertising keyword, the practice was referred to as an ambush strategy [Steel and 
Vranica, 2008]. 
Regardless of specific terminology, search marketing experts recommend buying competitors‘ keywords as an 
effective strategy [e.g., Stern, 2008]—despite the legal uncertainty. Although there has been substantial litigation to 
date [Sullivan, 2007], the legality of piggybacking with regard to trademark infringement remains unclear, at least in 
part because many cases have been settled out-of-court, thus establishing few legal precedents. In the cases in 
which verdicts have been reached, the U.S. courts are split on whether piggybacking constitutes trademark 
infringement by either the advertiser or the search engine [Grimmelmann, 2007]. 
 
The legal issues involved have been analyzed in numerous law review articles [e.g., Goldman, 2005; McGeveran, 
2008; Troxclair, 2005]. For example, Goldman [2005] examines the perspectives of searchers, publishers, and 
search providers, and concludes that trademark law should be updated. From the consumers‘ perspective, the 
relevancy of the actual content presented by search engines should be considered, and search engines should be 
given protection from liability as encouragement to deliver the most relevant content to consumers. Schecter and 
Thomas [2003] add that it is the role of trademark law to balance the wishes of those who would monopolize the use 
of a trademark with the wishes of ―others who feel they have a right or need to use it for their own purposes‖ (p. 
540). However, legal scholars still have much to do in the area of search engine law [Grimmelmann, 2007]. They 
generally agree that these issues are years away from legal resolution [e.g., Troxclair, 2005]. 
 
Currently, all three major search advertising platforms‘ policies prohibit ―trademark-infringing‖ uses of ads or 
keywords [Google, 2009; Microsoft, 2009; Yahoo!, 2009]. However, they require aggrieved trademark holders to file 
a complaint with them before any corrective action may be taken. Thus, the burden of trademark enforcement falls 
on the advertiser and not the search engine. The big difference among the search engines is that only Google allows 
piggybacking (with the exception of 30+ countries, mostly in Europe, many in which litigation is taking place) 
[Naffziger, 2009a]. Google will not investigate complaints alleging trademark infringement based solely on the 
purchase of brand names or other trademarks to trigger advertisements. Thus, Google is taking the legal position 
that piggybacking does not constitute trademark infringement. That is why advertisers may be angry at Google in 
particular. 
 
A key factor in this controversy is the great importance of brand names in e-commerce. Research has shown the 
prevalence of brand names as search terms [e.g., Ghose and Yang, 2008a; Ghose and Yang, 2008b; Pan, Litvin, 
and O‘Donnell, 2007]. Brands have been found to raise consumer intent to purchase in both traditional and internet 
distribution channels [Lee, Ang, and Dubelaar, 2005; Ye, 2007], as they function as signals of trustworthiness. It is 
already widely accepted that consumer trust is essential for the success of e-commerce [e.g., Hoffman, Novak, and 
Peralta, 1999]. 
 
Yet, trust has already been shown to be an issue with perceived relevance of sponsored ads [cf., Jansen, 2007; 
Jansen and Resnick, 2006]. Research participants also indicated trustworthiness as an issue. If consumers perceive 
piggybacking to also be deceptive, that would make matters worse. For example, research on online advertising 
[Rohrer and Boyd, 2004] has found that deceptive advertising can negatively affect the user experience at Yahoo!. 
Given that search engines depend on advertising to fund their business models, they may not want to encourage 
practices that could jeopardize consumer trust. Grazioli and Jarvenpaa [2003] put it this way, ―the collapse of 
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telemarketing revenues during the 1980s, largely ascribed to the loss of consumer trust, is a warning of what might 
happen to e-commerce if public trust in the medium fades‖ (pp. 93–94). Thus, should piggybacking be found to be 
both widespread and deceptive, it‘s effect on e-commerce and Internet search engines could be devastating. 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Despite the worldwide controversy over predatory keyword advertising, there has been little empirical investigation 
into the phenomenon. How prevalent is piggybacking? Does it differ among search engines? What is the effect on 
ad placement? Does the practice vary among industries? These are the motivators for our research. 
Research Question #1: What are the various forms of piggybacking? 
The limited research available currently lumps all piggybacking together. However, we can conceive of piggybacking 
taking many forms. For example, taking customers away from the competition is what often comes to mind in a 
discussion of piggybacking, as in Mazda courting searchers looking for Pontiac automobiles [Carty, 2006]. Certainly, 
companies might be concerned about the use of their trademark in these situations. However, what if the 
trademarked term is used by other retailers selling the company‘s products, for example, a store promoting a 
specific manufacturers‘ electronics gear? Thus, instances of piggybacking may span a range of seeming legitimacy. 
How much diversity is there among advertisers in terms of types of piggybacking, and how does this vary across 
industries? We seek to define piggybacking in a more systematic way that permits detailed investigation of the 
phenomenon. 
Research Question #2: How prevalent is piggybacking? 
Media attention and advertiser lawsuits [e.g., Steel, 2008; Sullivan, 2007] may suggest that piggybacking is a 
common practice. But is it? This research investigates the 100 top global brands in the U.S. and the results of 
searches of these brand names on three major search engines in order to get a clearer picture of piggybacking, 
particularly in terms of its prevalence. 
Research Question #3: How does piggybacking vary by market sector? 
Does piggybacking occur primarily in the travel industry, as one might conclude from the press [e.g., May, 2009; 
Steel, 2008], or is it more widespread? The brands selected for study here span across sixteen market sectors, 
providing a wider picture of the practice. 
IV. RESEARCH METHODS 
In order to get a broad view of the piggybacking phenomenon, we selected a collection of brands that spanned 
across many diverse market sectors. Our focus was on large brands because it has been suggested that 
piggybacking is most effective when smaller companies try to take advantage of the well-established brand‘s 
goodwill or of larger, more dominant organizations‘ reputations [e.g., Steel, 2008; Stern, 2008]. We explored several 
lists of brands on the Web, including The American Customer Satisfaction Index [ACSI, 2006], Business Week‘s Top 
Brand 100 [Business Week, 2009], and BrandZ Top 100 Most Powerful Brands Ranking [Millward, Brownmor, 
Optimor, 2008]. After examination of these three brand lists, we selected the BrandZ Top 100 Most Powerful Brands 
Ranking because this list provided substantial details about the brands and categorized each brand into a market 
sector. The brand list is provided in Appendix A. 
 
Each of these 100 brands was submitted to Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Live Search (MSN Live). These three 
search engines were selected because they were the largest keyword advertising platforms in the sponsored search 
area. 
 
We submitted each brand as a query to one of the search engines, capturing the first two search engine results 
pages. Given that 80 percent of searchers never go past the second page [Jansen and Spink, 2005], we decided 
that capturing just the first two SERPs was appropriate. In each query, we included only the brand name with no 
other terms. For example, we used the query Tide rather than a phrase like Tide detergent. We did this because the 
keyword advertising platforms have a variety of matching functions, including a ―broad match.‖ So, if terms other 
than the brand name were included in the query, the non-brand term might have been the term that triggered the ad. 
Using only the brand name helped to ensure that the brand name, rather than another term, triggered the ad, 
although a few brand names that contain generic terms (e.g. bank, mobile) still triggered other advertisements. This 
process of submitting the query and capturing the first two SERPs was repeated for each brand and each search 
engine. 
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First, the number of organic (aka, non-sponsored or natural) search results for each query was recorded. Next, for 
each sponsored ad captured, the following information was collected or assigned: 
a. Indication of ad placement by brandholder (self-bid)—If the landing page of the ad was determined to 
be one of the brand‘s official websites, we assumed that the advertiser had bid on its own brand name. 
This was then noted. For all other sponsored ads, we coded the piggybacking type (below). Our thought 
process was that, since the query contained only the brand term, any ad that was not from that brand 
must be a form of piggybacking. 
b. Piggybacking type—Type is derived from a content analysis of sponsored ads and is discussed later. 
c. Ad position—Keyword advertisements typically appear in three locations on the SERP. These three 
locations are referred to in the industry as North, East, and South as shown in Figure 1. The North 
position, above the organic search results, is considered to be the most desirable for an advertiser. A 
sponsored ad‘s position on the SERP is determined by the search engine, based on the advertiser‘s bid 
and the search engine‘s estimate of ad quality. Ad position is an interesting variable for several 
reasons. First, it is well-established that link location influences how often a link is clicked [e.g., Jansen 
and Spink, 2009]. Second, the position of a sponsored link may affect the likelihood of consumer 
confusion between brands [cf., Brooks, 2004; Jansen and Resnick, 2006; O'Connor, 2009]. 
d. Occurrence of the brand name in the ad title, text, or URL (see Figure 2)—In addition to advertiser 
complaints about piggybacking, unauthorized use of companies‘ trademarks displaying in the ad have 
also drawn complaints [e.g., Steel, 2008]. Like piggybacking, enforcement of trademark policies by the 
search engine is not undertaken until the advertiser complains directly to the search engine. 
 
Figure 1. Locations of Sponsored Ads 
. 
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Source: http://www.whyiblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/adsample.jpg. 
Figure 2. Elements of a Sponsored Ad—Example from Google 
Conventional content analysis [Krippendorff, 1980] is ―usually appropriate when existing theory or research literature 
on a phenomenon is limited‖ [Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279]. We used inductive category development, allowing 
the categories to be grounded in the data. Each author examined a small sample of ads first, and then the two 
authors compared findings and developed the single classification presented here. Following several discussions 
and generations of coding rules for each ad type, the two authors divided the coding task. One author coded brands 
1–50, while the other coded brands 51–100. Inter-coder reliability for the piggybacking classification was estimated 
by coding 10 percent of the 300 queries by both authors. To confirm the level of agreement, inter-coder reliability 
was checked by Cohen‘s Kappa [Landis and Koch, 1977]. Cohen‘s Kappa was 0.807, which is on the borderline 
between ―substantial‖ and ―almost perfect‖ agreement. 
V. RESULTS 
Our 100 queries on the three search engines generated 8,345 results on the 600 SERPs. Of these results, 5,995 
were organic, and 2,350 were sponsored. 
Research Question #1: What are the various forms of piggybacking? 
As shown in Table 1, we derived a classification of piggybacking advertisements. 
 
Table 1: Types of Piggybacking 
Types of Piggybacking Explanation 
a. Competitive Obvious competitor (i.e., in the same industry selling a competitive 
product/service) 
b. Promotional Promoting product/service of the brand (e.g., a reseller of the brand or some 
other function that assists in selling the product, i.e. coupons or free samples) 
c. Orthogonal Offering a different product/service from the product/service offered by the 
brand (e.g., corporate information about the brandholder, training on the 
brandholder‘s product, information on the general subject area of the 
brandholder‘s product area, etc.) 
 
The first class, ―Competitive,‖ includes ads on which a competitor to the brand obviously bid on the brand name. 
This is the common definition or understanding of piggybacking. Figure 3 shows an example of carmaker Infiniti 
displaying an ad on Google in response to the query ―BMW‖ (the brand of a competing automaker). In this example, 
the search term is not displayed in the text of the ad. It is the official Infiniti site. Nevertheless, some advertisers 
object to this type of use of their trademarks, interpreting it as a competitor taking advantage of the goodwill of their 
trademark. 
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Figure 3. Sponsored Ad from Google—Triggered by the Search Query: “BMW,” 
an Example of “Competitive” Piggybacking 
 
The second type of piggybacking is ―Promotional.‖ These advertisements direct searchers to a landing page of a 
company or organization that is in some way, either formally or informally, promoting one or more of the brand‘s 
products or services. Figure 4 shows an example of CVS, the pharmacy retailer, displaying an ad on Microsoft 
LiveSearch in response to the query ―L‘Oreal‖ (the brand of a beauty products company). In this example, the search 
term appears in both the title and text of the ad. Currently, all three search engines allow resellers to do this. This 
appears to be a legitimate case of a retailer selling a manufacturer‘s product. 
 
 
Figure 4. Sponsored Ad from MSN LiveSearch—Triggered by the Search Query: “L’Oreal,” 
an Example of “Promotional” Piggybacking 
 
The third type of piggybacking is ―Orthogonal.‖ In this form of piggybacking, the advertisement landing page is not 
that of the brand, a competitor, or a promoter of the brand. Instead, these landing pages are typically information 
websites providing information or opinion concerning the brand. The product/service provided is completely different 
from that of the brandholder. Figure 5 shows an example of Hoover‘s, a business information aggregator, displaying 
an ad on Yahoo! in response to the query ―ibm‖ (the global computer systems and services company). In this 
example, the searched-for brand name appears in the ad title. Currently, all three search engines allow informational 
sites to do this. Clearly, Hoover‘s is not selling IBM products/services or products/services that compete with those 
of IBM. This appears to be a legitimate case of using a trademark to refer to a company. 
 
Ibm 
Locations, products, execs, financials, competitors, & 
more. View now. 
www.hoovers.com 
 
Figure 5. Sponsored Ad from Yahoo!—Triggered by the Search Query: “ibm,” 
an Example of “Orthogonal” Piggybacking 
Research Question #2: How prevalent is piggybacking? 
Table 2 shows the total number of links (organic search results and sponsored ads) found on the 600 SERPs from 
the three search engines broken down by number of organic results, number of sponsored ads, and number of 
sponsored ads that were classified as one of the three types of piggybacking ads. 
 
Page for page, Google displayed fewer sponsored ads than the other two search engines did. Table 2 also shows 
that piggybacking (as a percentage of total sponsored ads) is a fairly common occurrence with percentages ranging 
from a low of 63.9 percent of occurrence on Google to a high of 94.3 percent on Yahoo!. An ANOVA clearly shows 
that there is a difference in number of piggybacked sponsored ads across search engines (F(2) = 54.67 , p <= 0.01). 
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Table 2: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Search Engine 
 Total 
Links 
Organic 
Results 
Sponsored 
Ads 
Piggybacking 
Ads 
% 
Piggybacking 
Google 2269 2000 269 172 63.9 
Yahoo! 3278 2000 1278 1191 93.2 
MSN 2798 1995 803 677 84.3 
 8345 5995 2350 2040 86.8 
 
Next, we looked at piggybacking by type. Of the 300 search queries of brand names, twenty-seven, or 9 percent, 
contained at least one instance of competitive piggybacking. By search engine, these twenty-seven queries were 
broken down by search engine as follows: Yahoo!—11, Google—9, and MSN—7. Overall, twenty-three of the 100 
brands were piggybacked by competitors. The ad occurrence of piggybacking by type, by position, and by search 
engine is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Type and Ad Position 
Search 
Engine 
Piggybacking 
Type 
North North 
% of 
Type 
East East 
% of 
Type 
South South 
% of 
Type 
Total 
by 
Type 
Total 
% by 
Type 
Google Competitive 0 0.0 11 6.5 0 0.0 11 6.4 
 Promotional 2 100.0 132 77.6 0 0.0 134 77.9 
 Orthogonal 0 0.0 27 15.9 0 0.0 27 15.7 
 Total by Position 2 100.0 170 100.0 0 0.0 172 100.0 
Yahoo! Competitive 8 5.2 35 4.5 9 3.5 52 4.4 
 Promotional 106 68.8 509 65.3 157 61.1 772 64.8 
 Orthogonal 40 26.0 236 30.3 91 35.4 367 30.8 
 Total by Position 154 100.0 780 100.0 257 100.0 1191 100.0 
MSN Live Competitive 8 4.5 5 1.4 5 3.8 18 2.7 
 Promotional 87 49.2 221 60.3 67 50.4 375 55.4 
 Orthogonal 82 46.3 141 38.3 61 45.9 284 41.9 
 Total by Position 177 100.0 367 100.0 133 100.0 677 100.0 
 
Despite the high occurrences of piggybacking (shown in Table 2), closer examination presents a somewhat different 
picture. The vast majority of piggybacking is the Promotional type, ranging from 55.4 percent on MSN Live to 77.9 
percent on Google. The second most frequently occurring type of piggybacking is Orthogonal, ranging from 15.7 
percent on Google to 41.9 percent on MSN Live. What is most interesting, however, is the low occurrence of 
Competitive piggybacking, which has generated controversy in some circles, including in the press. The occurrence 
of this type of piggybacking is in the single digits for all search engines, ranging from a low of 2.7 percent on MSN 
Live to a high of 6.4 percent on Google. We see that in general the majority of occurrences of piggybacking were 
positioned in the East ads, and not in the higher visibility, more frequently clicked ads in the North position. Google‘s 
policy at the time of the study was to avoid placing ads in the South position. 
 
Research Question #3: How does piggybacking vary by market sector? 
The percentage of piggybacking in sponsored ads varied from 50 percent to 98.4 percent across the market sectors. 
An ANOVA shows a significant difference across the sectors (F(15) = 5.36, p <= 0.01). Table 4 breaks down the 
occurrence of piggybacking across market sectors and by type. There is little Competitor piggybacking (as a 
percentage of sponsored ads), ranging from 0 percent to 20.9 percent across all sectors, with no significant 
difference among industries (F(15) = 0.73, p = 0.75). There was also no significant difference for Orthogonal 
piggybacking (F(15) = 1.35, p = 0.17). However, the sectors vary significantly in terms of the percentages for 
Promotional (F(15) = 7.95 , p <= 0.01)). 
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Table 4: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Type and Market Sector 
Sector Competitive % of 
Sector 
Promotional % of 
Sector 
Orthogonal % of 
Sector 
Total of 
Sector 
% of All 
Sectors 
Apparel 13 14.8% 57 74.0% 18 23.4% 88 4.3% 
Beverages 1 1.7% 15 25.9% 42 72.4% 58 2.8% 
Cars 4 1.0% 298 77.4% 87 22.6% 389 19.1% 
Cigarettes 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 4 0.2% 
Consumer 
Goods 
1 2.6% 7 18.4% 31 81.6% 39 1.9% 
Entertainment 0 0.0% 23 76.7% 7 23.3% 30 1.5% 
Fast Food 0 0.0% 4 11.4% 31 88.6% 35 1.7% 
Financial 17 6.7% 124 51.7% 114 47.5% 255 12.5% 
Insurance 4 4.9% 32 40.0% 46 57.5% 82 4.0% 
Luxury 5 3.2% 138 91.4% 13 8.6% 156 7.6% 
Mobile 1 0.8% 76 58.5% 53 40.8% 130 6.4% 
Motorcycles 0 0.0% 23 79.3% 6 20.7% 29 1.4% 
Personal Care 1 1.6% 27 42.9% 35 55.6% 63 3.1% 
Retail 19 20.9% 5 6.8% 67 90.5% 91 4.5% 
Technology 15 2.6% 449 79.2% 113 19.9% 577 28.3% 
Transportation 0 0.0% 3 21.4% 11 78.6% 14 0.7% 
Total 81 4.0% 1,281 62.8% 678 33.2% 2040 100.0% 
Average 5.06 3.8% 80.06 47.2% 42.38 52.0% 127.50 6.3% 
Additional Results 
In addition to the bidding on branding terms, advertiser complaints about trademark use also include the use of their 
brand names by others in the text of sponsored ads [cf., Steel, 2008]. Table 5 summarizes the occurrences of third-
party brand names found in the ads‘ text, broken down by search engine and type of the ad in the SERP. As shown 
in Table 5, the use of trademarked terms by competitors is extremely low. 
 
Table 5: Occurrences of Brand Term in Ad 
 Mention of 
Brand 
Sponsored 
Total 
% Mention Competitive Promotional Orthogonal 
Google 137 269 50.9% 0 109 28 
Yahoo! 943 1278 73.8% 2 660 281 
MSN 534 803 66.5% 4 401 129 
Total 1614 2350 68.7% 6 1170 438 
 
As shown in Table 6, those six competitive piggybacking ad occurrences are the result of just two ads, one ad in one 
query on MSN Live, and one ad in one query on Yahoo!. 
 
Table 6: Competitive Piggybacking Ads with Brand Names in Ad Text 
Ad: Cisco - fonality.com 
Small Business Phone System. 15-500 Employees? 
Try Fonality. 
 
Genesis - Official Site 
Better Braking than the Mercedes & Affordable. 
Think About it. 
HyundaiGenesis.com 
Advertiser: Fonality Hyundai 
Search engine: MSN Live Yahoo! 
Search query: Cisco Mercedes 
# Ad impressions: 4 2 
Positions of impressions: North/South on first two SERPs East/South on first SERP 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Issues in the Piggybacking Classification Development 
We considered creating finer-grain categories in the classification. For example, the Promotional category contains 
mainly two types of advertisers: traditional retailers (e.g., car dealers, pharmacies, and department stores) and 
comparison shopping web merchants (e.g., Shopzilla, NexTag, Pronto, etc.). There is also a small contingent of 
sites offering coupons or free samples of the brand‘s products. The Orthogonal category contains advertisers 
offering products/services that, although unrelated to the brand‘s products/services, vary in degree of direct 
relevance to the brand. For example, as previously noted in Figure 5, an ad by Hoovers.com was triggered by the 
brand, IBM. Although their service of providing corporate information is unrelated to IBM‘s products and services, the 
information itself being promoted is about IBM (i.e., directly related to the brand). Contrast this with an ad triggered 
by the query, ―CocaCola‖ by BuyBetterTickets.com for the CocaCola 600, a NASCAR racing event that‘s really not 
about beverages. Thus, the Orthogonal ads varied greatly in relevance to the triggering brand term. Also, another, 
smaller portion of Orthogonal ads were triggered by brand names that were homonyms. For example, the brand, 
Marlboro, triggered an ad for a hotel in Marlborough, a suburb of Boston, with the hotel presumably trying to 
capitalize on searchers‘ mis-spellings. Finally, the Competitive category could have been broken into two: those 
competitive ads that used the brand in the actual ad text and those that did not (which were only six of 1,614 
piggybacking ads with brand mentions, see Table 5). 
 
We chose the three broad piggybacking classes because the focus of our study is how organizations use others‘ 
brands to trigger ads resulting from consumers‘ search queries. From the perspective of the brandholder, assuming 
that a searcher is intending to find the brandholder‘s products/services, piggybacking can result in three broad 
situation types. The brandholder can be possibly threatened by the display of a competitor‘s ad, possibly helped by a 
third party‘s ad promoting the brandholder, or unaffected by an advertisement that is orthogonal to the brandholder‘s 
purposes. Also, the Promotional and Orthogonal categories correspond well with the ―reseller‖ and ―informational 
site‖ categories of exceptions for using others‘ trademarks, found in both Microsoft‘s and Yahoo‘s policies. Thus, we 
believe that the three higher-level categories fit well with the focus of the research. 
Piggybacking in Terms of Prevalence and Deception 
This research explored a variety of types of relationships between advertisers who bid on others‘ trademarks, and 
the trademark holders. The results clearly show that the majority of ads triggered by brands were, in fact, sponsored 
by organizations other than the brandholder—86.8 percent. Other organizations‘ ads to sell or promote the 
brandholder‘s products/services comprised 62.8 percent of those piggybacking ads. Approximately, another third of 
the piggybacking ads promote non-competing products/services, while only the remaining 4 percent of the ads were 
of a directly competitive nature. Thus, it is not unusual (with any of the three major search engines) for organizations 
to use another organization‘s brand to trigger an ad. However, the percentage of Competitive ads is comparatively 
small. 
 
Regarding the potential deceptiveness of piggybacking as ―bait and switch‖ advertising, only six of 1,614 ad 
occurrences (0.3 percent) contained the competitor‘s actual trademark in the ad text. Table 6 shows the two ads that 
caused those six occurrences: one by the car-maker, Hyundai, and the other by telephony provider, Fonality. The 
reader can see that the former is a fairly straightforward comparison advertisement. The latter, however, using their 
competitor‘s name as the headline, could easily be interpreted as an advertisement for the searched-for brand, when 
in fact it is not. This was the only instance we found in over two-thousand advertisements in which a competitive 
trademark appeared to be used in a potentially deceptive manner. Thus, the alleged deceptiveness of piggybacking, 
claimed by some [AABC, 2008], eroding trust in e-commerce, appears in actuality to be a non-issue. 
 
We found that piggybacking clearly differs by market sector (Table 4). However, in terms of piggybacking type, only 
the Promotional type was found to vary by sector. With the caveat of a small sample, the retail and apparel sectors 
had the highest percentages of competitive piggybacking. The travel sector, some of whose members have 
identified themselves as victims of piggybacking [Steel, 2008; AABC, 2008], was not represented in the list of the top 
global brands. 
Google and Brand Searches 
One striking result is how many fewer total sponsored ads Google displayed for a query in comparison to the 
Microsoft and Yahoo!—an average of less than one ad on the first two SERPS. This is compared to an average of 
approximately four ads for Yahoo, and about two and two-third ads for MSN. Of that lower total of sponsored ads 
displayed, Google displayed a lower percentage of them as piggybacking ads as well. It would be interesting to be 
able to compare these numbers to those of other types of (non-brand-triggered) queries. 
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Several different strands of the data, when considered together, could be interpreted to indicate that Google may 
have done a better job of delivering relevant ads to these brand-name queries, while at the same time, providing 
brandholders less of a risk of threat by competitive ads. Given that Google has often been vilified in the press for its 
refusal to disallow piggybacking [e.g., Steel, 2008], this indeed would be an interesting result. 
 
Following is the analysis. It is based on the assumption (which could be verified by future user studies) that, in 
general, the presence of a brand-name in a query usually means that the searcher is looking-for/interested-in that 
brandholder‘s product or service. Certainly, it is difficult in general to infer searcher intent based strictly on a query‘s 
search terms [Russell et al., 2009]. However, considering the entire set of queries, it does not seem unreasonable to 
assume that, in general, the searcher in most cases is interested in the brand‘s products or services. Given that 
assumption, we can broadly classify the ad-types we‘ve studied here into a general hierarchy of relevance toward 
these brand-related queries. For example, in general, it is reasonable to believe that the ―self-bid‖ ads, those 
sponsored by the brandholder, would be the most relevant to the brand query. Again, there will be exceptions (e.g., 
a query to discover the current IBM stock price, or directions to the nearest Wal-Mart), but overall, we assume that 
most of the searchers‘ interests are focused on the brand product/service. Thus, by definition, on average, the self-
bids ads as a group would be more relevant than any of the types of piggybacking ads. Following the same logic, the 
next most relevant type of ad triggered by the brand name would be the Promotional piggybacking type. It promotes 
the same product/service as the brandholder. In general, it might not be as relevant as the brandholder‘s ad, but it 
would on average be more definitely more relevant than the Orthogonal ad type, and usually more relevant than the 
Competitive piggybacking type because the Promotional type deals with the brandholder specified in the query. 
 
Thus, given these assumptions, we propose a three-level hierarchy of relevance to brand-related queries: self-bid, 
Promotional piggybacking and a third, least relevant level containing the Competitive and Orthogonal piggybacking 
ads. Given this hierarchy, and our general assumption of brand product/service interest, Google looks like it serves 
up the most relevant ads in response to brand queries. It has, by orders of magnitude, the highest percentage of 
self-bid ads, the highest level of relevance in the hierarchy (Table 7), especially considering that almost half of 
MSN‘s self-bid ads are in the least visible South position, below all the organic search results and all the other ads. 
Google also leads handily in the second highest level of relevance in the hierarchy, Promotional piggybacking ads 
(Table 3). Thus, all other things being equal (which would need to be verified by future research), based on types of 
ads and seemingly reasonable assumptions we made those about types of ads and searchers‘ intent, Google‘s 
results appear to be more relevant to these queries containing major brandholders‘ brands. 
 
Table 7: Occurrences of Self-Bidding 
 Sponsored Total Self-bid 
Total 
% 
Self-bid 
North East South 
Google 269 97 36.1% 30 67 0 
Yahoo! 1278 87 6.8% 65 12 10 
MSN 803 126 15.7% 54 14 58 
Total 2350 310 13.2% 149 93 68 
 
Further, one could assert that Google‘s results pose less of a threat to brandholders when their marks are used as 
search terms, based on examining where the ads are placed vis-à-vis the organic results, in the North, East, or 
South positions. To simplify the analysis, we make the reasonable assumption the North position poses the 
predominant threat of competitive piggybacking to brandholders. Our data bolsters this assumption in that the vast 
majority of queries found the brandholder in the #1 organic result position. (In the few cases where this was not true, 
most of the time the brandholder was #2, following the Wikipedia entry of the brandholder. A small number of 
exceptions were foreign brands like Ariel (detergent), and TIM (Telecom Italia Mobile), which are extremely 
polysemous and less-searched-for in the English versions of the search engines we tested. Thus, Competitive ads 
will usually be seen first by the searcher only if they appear in the North position [e.g., Richardson et al., 2007]. So, 
by putting mostly self-bid ads and no Competitive piggybacking ads in North, the threat to Google‘s advertisers was 
minimized. 
 
In contrast, although the number is low, both Yahoo! and MSN put competitive ads in North (Table 3). Further, they 
put significant percentages of Promotional piggybacking ads, which although supporting the brandholders (mostly as 
resellers), often promote competitive products/services as well. Thus, despite unfavorable press and lawsuits on this 
subject, one could argue that Google actually provides advertisers with a more hospitable advertising environment. 
Again, further research is necessary to establish this. Examining ad positions also bolsters the argument for Google 
having comparatively more relevant search results for these queries. Both Yahoo! and MSN put significant 
percentages of Orthogonal piggybacking ads in the North position. Finally, we again caution that ad relevance is 
ultimately judged by search engine users, and these phenomena need to be verified by user studies. 
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Microsoft Bing and Brand Searches 
In the time since our data collection, Microsoft has introduced the Bing search engine which is reported to address 
many of the issues discussed here regarding brand searches (Wallace, 2009). Wallace reports that Bing often limits 
or downgrades the visibility of sponsored ads in general. Thus, the number of less relevant ads resulting from brand 
searches (e.g., Orthogonal piggybacking) may be reduced and/or decreased in visibility. This is a win for the 
consumer, but maybe not for the brandholder, because of the following. Wallace describes Bing‘s ―Similar to this‖ 
feature: ―Bing almost always shows highly visible links to competitors on branded searches‖ (see Figure 6). 
Regarding the links in Bing‘s Similar to This feature, Wallace (2009) asserts: 
…this is likely to decrease CTR [clickthrough rate] on branded terms and increase comparison 
shopping by users. Furthermore, it‘s clear that it is focusing on the most significant competitors—so 
the consequence is not going to be the same for different brands. For larger, more established brands, 
they would be more likely to show on competitor branded searches than lesser known brands. So 
lesser known brands will have a reduction in branded click traffic because of an increase in diverted 
traffic to competitors, but will not have a corresponding increase in traffic from its competitors. In other 
words, smaller brands get hurt and bigger brands get helped by this system. 
Wallace, 2009. 
 
This then puts competitive links adjacent to the brandholder‘s organic search result. This benefit again goes to the 
consumer, and to the major brandholder, by eliminating the need for the competitive bidding that Google seems to 
be encouraging. On the downside, Microsoft loses the potential revenue while the brandholders can no longer 
prevent the more significant competitors from appearing with them. However, if lesser-known or unknown brands 
were to flee from Bing, that could potentially increase the perceived relevance of Bing‘s sponsored ads, as 
compared with other search engines. However, this could also be perceived as reducing the diversity of 
advertisements with a resulting constriction of consumer choice. 
 
 
Figure 6. Screenshot of Microsoft’s Bing Search Engine SERP—Triggered by the Query: “geico” 
Limitations and Strengths of this Work 
The limitations of our study are that we examined only the largest major brands. Although we believe that this brand 
selection method returns results similar to that from the market as a whole, other brand listings or market niches 
might produce different results. Also, advertisers may vary their ads based on time of day, week, season, and locale. 
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In addition, the specific ads displayed can be affected by competitive bidding at the time the search query is made. 
There are several strengths of the study. First, we used a large number of well-known brands with major impact from 
a variety of industry sections. This ensured our results have practical and influential implications. Second, we 
approached our analysis of piggybacking from a variety of perspectives, using a mixed methods approach and 
employing both quantitative and qualitative measures. This helped ensure that our findings are robust. Third, our 
focus on piggybacking is an emerging area with potentially significant impact on the advertising and search engines 
area. Therefore, our research is timely and has practical implications in the marketplace. 
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although it seems like piggybacking is not a widespread or deceptive threat to e-commerce, there are still many 
research opportunities to follow-up on this exploratory study. For example, this work could be reproduced with 
different brands, different market sectors, and using non-U.S. search engines. Further, studies of user perceptions 
are crucial when considering issues like deceptiveness and relevance of advertisements. Future research could 
involve in-depth analysis of search behavior to see whether piggybacking improves or degrades the customer 
experience, and whether trust in the search engine is affected. Other e-commerce platforms with search capabilities, 
such as Amazon or eBay, could be explored in terms of potentially deceptive use of trademarks. Social networking 
sites also allow the possibility of using other companies‘ brand names. For example, Needleman [2009] reports of an 
instance on Twitter.com in which a company created a profile named for a competitor but promoted its own services 
instead. Also, the effect of piggybacking on keyword prices would be of interest to search engines and advertisers. 
Previous work by Stewart [2006; Stewart and Malaga, 2009] provides plausible theories to be tested that relate to 
piggybacking. For example, Stewart and Malaga [2009] found an ―assimilation effect‖ among adjacent links which 
raised consumers‘ trusting beliefs in an unfamiliar organization when its link was surrounded by links of trusted 
organizations. Given this result, the authors go on to suggest ―a new Web search business model‖ in which 
companies could bid on which other companies‘ links would appear next to them. They further suggest that ―an 
unfamiliar company might bid to appear along with familiar trusted companies in the same industry‖ (p. 88)—exactly 
what can happen when a lesser-known company piggybacks on a dominant brand. The piggybacker‘s ad appears 
near the major brand‘s organic listing(s) (as well as their ad, if the major brand self-bid). Is there an assimilation 
effect in this case? Future research could test whether this trust transfer from familiar to unfamiliar company works in 
the search advertising context. If so, this would be empirical evidence of the value of piggybacking for less dominant 
brands. (As an aside: given Stewart and Malaga‘s result, Bing‘s policy of excluding these brands from its ―Similar to 
This‖ list (Figure 6) would prevent this assimilation effect from benefitting small advertisers.) 
Stewart [2006] also found a similar trust transfer to an unknown company, if it was linked to by a trusted 
organization. Given these two situations of trust transfer from a trusted to an unknown company, is there a similar 
transfer of trust when the ad of an unknown company appears as a result of a search for the brand name of a 
trusted organization? This would also be an interesting property of piggybacking. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
With the study‘s scope and limitations in mind, we have shown that competitive piggybacking is not the widespread, 
deceptive practice that some would have us believe. Only 4 percent of the ad displays studied was competitive in 
nature, and only one advertisement sampled was found to be potentially deceptive regarding its sponsor. 
This study has filled a gap in the existing literature by comprehensively examining the phenomenon of piggybacking, 
which could have great impact on consumers, advertisers, and search engines alike. We have created a taxonomy 
of piggybacking, and used it to hypothesize, for example, that although Google has been blamed for its stance on 
the piggybacking issue, it may be providing the most relevant results, while at the same time, placing competitive 
ads in positions of lower visibility. 
We sympathize with stakeholders on all sides of the piggybacking issue. Large advertisers want to ―own‖ the pages 
that result from searches for their brand names. They prefer not to have competitors show up at all in ―their‖ search 
results. Also, they prefer not to pay high prices for their own brand names as ad triggers, or even have to bid at all 
on trademarks that they already own. On the other hand, search engines want to provide the most relevant results to 
consumers while protecting or increasing the ad revenue which funds their business models. As researchers, there 
are many opportunities to add data to the debate. Findings on user perceptions of trust and satisfaction, effects on 
advertising costs, and resulting advertising strategies can only help us increase our understanding of the consumer 
search process in e-commerce. 
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APPENDIX A—LIST OF BRANDS USED AS SEARCH QUERIES 
Table A-1: List of Brands Used as Search Queries 
Rank Brand Brand 
Value ($M) 
Market 
Sector 
Rank Brand Brand 
Value ($M) 
Market 
Sector 
1  Google 86,057  Technology 51  BlackBerry 13,734  Technology 
2  GE 
 (General Electric) 
71,379  Technology 52  Chase 12,782  Financial 
3  Microsoft 70,887  Technology 53  Nike 12,499  Apparel 
4  Coca-Cola  58,208  Beverages 54  Canon 12,398  Technology 
5  China Mobile 57,225  Mobile 55  AT&T 12,030  Mobile 
6  IBM 55,335  Technology 56  Starbucks 12,011  Fast Food 
7  Apple 55,206  Technology 57  Goldman 
 Sachs 
11,944  Financial 
8  McDonald‘s 49,499  Fast Food 58  Samsung 11,870  Technology 
9  Nokia 43,975  Technology 59  Nissan 11,707  Cars 
10  Marlboro 37,324  Cigarettes 60  Marks & 
 Spencer 
11,600  Retail 
11  Vodafone 36,962  Mobile 61  Amazon 11,511  Retail 
12  Toyota 35,134  Cars 62  Yahoo! 11,465  Technology 
13  Wal-Mart 34,547  Retail 63  Morgan 
 Stanley 
11,327  Financial 
14  Bank of America 33,092  Financial 64  UBS 11,220  Financial 
15  Citi 30,318  Financial 65  eBay 11,200  Retail 
16  HP 29,278  Technology 66  H&M 11,182  Apparel 
17  BMW 28,015  Cars 67  Wachovia 11,022  Financial 
18  ICBC 28,004  Financial 68  Ford 10,971  Cars 
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Table A-1: List of Brands Used as Search Queries 
Rank Brand Brand 
Value ($M) 
Market 
Sector 
Rank Brand Brand 
Value ($M) 
Market 
Sector 
19  Louis Vuitton 25,739  Luxury 69  Chevrolet 10,862  Cars 
20  American 
 Express 
24,816  Financial 70  Budweiser 10,839  Beverages 
21  Wells Fargo 24,739  Financial 71  Colgate 10,576  Personal 
 Care 
22  Cisco 24,101  Technology 72  Harley- 
 Davidson 
10,401  Motorcycles 
23  Disney 23,705  Entertainment 73  Subway 10,335  Fast Food 
24  UPS 23,610  Transportation 74  Merrill Lynch 9,802  Financial 
25  Tesco 23,208  Retail 75  JP Morgan 9,762  Financial 
26  Oracle 22,904  Technology 76  Hermès 9,631  Luxury 
27  Intel 22,027  Technology 77  BBVA 9,457  Financial 
28  Porsche 21,718  Cars 78  State Farm 9,425  Insurance 
29  SAP 21,669  Technology 79  Gucci 9,341  Luxury 
30  Gillette 21,523  Personal Care 80  Cartier 9,285  Luxury 
31  China Construc- 
 tion Bank 
19,603  Financial 81  FedEx 9,273  Transporta- 
 tion 
32  Bank of China 19,418  Financial 82  Tide 9,123  Consumer 
 Goods 
33  Verizon Wireless 19,202  Mobile 83  T-Mobile 8,940  Mobile 
34  Royal Bank of 
 Canada 
18,995  Financial 84  Zara 8,682  Apparel 
35  HSBC 18,479  Financial 85  Chanel 8,656  Luxury 
36  Mercedes 18,044  Cars 86  IKEA 8,507  Retail 
37  Honda 16,649  Cars 87  Ariel 8,437  Retail 
38  L‘Oréal 16,459  Luxury 88  Telefónica 
 Movistar 
8,117  Mobile 
39  Pepsi 15,404  Beverages 89  MTS 8,077  Mobile 
40  Home Depot 15,378  Retail 90  Esprit 7,907  Apparel 
41  Dell 15,288  Technology 91  TIM 7,903  Mobile 
42  Deutsche Bank 15,104  Financial 92  Motorola 7,575  Technology 
43  ING 15,080  Financial 93  Barclays 7,382  Financial 
44  Carrefour 15,057  Retail 94  Avon 7,209  Consumer 
 Goods 
45  NTT DoCoMo 15,048  Mobile 95  Auchan 7,148  Retail 
46  Target 14,738  Retail 96  VW 
 (Volkswagen) 
7,143  Cars 
47  Siemens 14,665  Technology 97  AXA 7,141  Insurance 
48  Banco 
Santander 
14,549  Financial 98  AIG 7,102  Insurance 
49  Accenture 14,137  Insurance 99  Mastercard 6,970  Financial 
50  Orange 14,093  Mobile 100  Standard 
 Chartered 
 Bank 
6,855  Financial 
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